Beginning with Ronald Hepburn’s path-breaking essay, “Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty,” which helped establish the modern discipline of environmental aesthetics, philosophers have provided sketches of what, after Hegel, might be called “philosophical histories of the aesthetics of nature.” These histories are remarkably similar and can easily be blended together to create a “received history” of the discipline. This history has subtly influenced work in the field. Unfortunately, it is not completely accurate and, as a result, has had (...) a misleading effect. A more accurate and expanded alternative history calls into question the received history’s view both on the origins of the field in arts-based aesthetic theories and on the nature and value of the aesthetic categories, “the picturesque” and “the sublime.” These categories were not borrowed from philosophy of art and inappropriately applied to nature, but instead were developed to appraise landscapes, which unlike natural objects could only rarely be judged beautiful since they are almost never symmetrical or ordered. (shrink)

Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as (...) “paleo‐logicans” in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations‐between‐relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the “analogical ape,” like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated. (shrink)

Arguing that we ought to look to psychedelic aesthetics of the 1960s in relation to current crises in liberal democracy, this book emphasizes the intersection of European thought and the psychedelic. The first half of the book focuses on philosophical influences of Herbert Marcuse and Antonin Artaud, while the second half shifts toward literary and theoretical influences of Aldous Huxley on psychedelic aesthetics. Framed within an emergent discourse of political theology, it suggests that taking a postsecular approach to psychedelic aesthetics (...) helps us understand deeper connections between aesthetics and politics. (shrink)

We argue that formal analogical reasoning is not a uniquely human trait but is found in chimpanzees, if not in monkeys. We also contest the claim that the relational matching-to-sample task is not exemplary of analogical behavior, and we provide evidence that symbolic-like treatment of relational information can be found in nonhuman species, a point in contention with the relational reinterpretation hypothesis.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Should Clinicians’ Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM?Elizabeth H. Flanagan (bio) and Roger K. Blashfield (bio)Keywordsclinicians, DSM, values, psychopathology, scienceThe relationship between clinicians and the DSM is complex. Clinicians are the primary intended audience of the DSM. However, as Widiger (2007) pointed out in his commentary, there is a tension associated with trying to meet the clinical goals of the DSM and also trying to optimize the (...) scientific goals of the DSM. Most commentators would agree that the recent editions of the DSM (from the DSM-III onward) have favored scientific values (e.g., Sadler 2005). Some commentators have taken sides and aligned themselves with either clinicians or with the science of classification. For instance, Garb (2005) has argued that clinicians should receive incentives to align themselves more closely with the science of the DSM. In contrast, Westen and Shedler (1999) have favored a clinician-based approach to the DSM and have argued that an ideal classification should be based on the prototypes that clinicians use to conceptualize diagnostic categories. Perhaps an extreme suggestion on how to deal with this tension between the values of clinicians and the values of scientists is to adopt the ICD-10 solution and create two versions of the next DSM. One version would be written for clinicians and another for researchers (Phillips et al. 2003).Widiger (2007) wondered whether the two of us as authors are on the fence about how the views of clinicians should affect the DSM. As clinical psychologists who are both clinicians and researchers, we understand his comment, especially in light of our attempt in our article not to overgeneralize from the time-consuming, labor-intensive, yet methodologically limited study we reported in our major paper.Nonetheless, our answer to the question asked in the title of this response, “Should clinicians’ views of mental illness influence the diagnostic manual?” is a clear and unequivocal yes. In our view, too much of the research literature stimulated by the recent DSMs has primarily used the diagnostic criteria in these DSMs to specify patient samples and then perform various experiments to study the DSM categories. We favor a different approach to research which is consistent with a comment once made by the philosopher of science, Karl Popper: “scientific theories originate from myths, and... a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories” (1963, 39). We believe that clinicians, with their years [End Page 285] of experience dealing with the ambiguities, the emotionality, and the chaos of psychopathology, have formed complex conceptual systems to try to understand the mysteries of abnormal behavior. We strongly support increased research attempts that will use clinicians as subjects and that will attempt to understand how clinicians use diagnostic concepts to understand patients.Although research on clinicians has not attracted a large amount of attention in the field, there is a long history of such research studies. For instance, in the 1970s, Overall used multivariate techniques to create graphical maps of how clinicians represented relationships among diagnoses (Overall et al. 1977). Widiger has used a similar strategy in some of his research (Widiger et al. 1987). In the early 1980s, a view of concept formation from cognitive psychology was used by Cantor et al. (1980) to look at psychiatric diagnoses as representing prototypes. Horowitz and colleagues extended this research. Blashfield and his colleagues had a grant to use the prototype model to study personality disorders and performed research investigating both case histories (Blashfield et al. 1985) and analyses of diagnostic criteria (Blashfield and Breen 1989; Davis, Blashfield, and McElroy 1993). Westen and colleagues have attempted to reconceptualize DSM personality disorder categories using the prototype model (Westen and Shedler 1999). Ahn and her colleagues (Ahn et al. 2006; Kim and Ahn 2002) have taken more recent applications of ideas from cognitive psychology to study how clinicians use and understand diagnostic categories. Finally, Flanagan and colleagues (Flanagan and Blashfield 2006; Flanagan, Keeley, and Blashfield, in press; Flanagan, Miller, and Davidson, submitted) have used qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques to try to understand the diagnostic concepts held by experienced clinicians.Besides empirical studies of how clinicians use diagnostic concepts, we also support the increased interest in... (shrink)

Using methods from anthropology and cognitive psychology, this study investigated the relationship between clinicians’ folk taxonomies of mental disorder and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Expert and novice psychologists were given sixty-seven DSM-IV diagnoses, asked to discard unfamiliar diagnoses, put the remaining diagnoses into groups that had “similar treatments” using hierarchical (making more inclusive and less inclusive groups) and dimensional (placing groups in a two-dimensional space) methodologies, and give names to the groups in their taxonomies. Clinicians (...) were familiar with a substantially smaller number of diagnoses than are in the DSM. Cultural consensus analysis and follow-up residual agreement analysis revealed similarities across clinicians’ folk taxonomies. Correlations between folk taxonomies and the DSM were moderate. Cluster analysis showed that clinicians preserved DSM higher order categories (e.g., mood disorders) but not the Axis I–Axis II distinction. This study suggests important differences between the way clinicians conceptualize mental disorders and the organization of the DSM-IV. (shrink)

Title: Michel Foucault Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan ISBN: 0312531664 Author: Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain Title: Michel Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect Publisher: Cornell University Press ISBN: 0801415721 Author: Karlis Racevskis.

Paden finds Rawls's new theory inadequate in its response to communitarian criticisms advocating a different theory of good than that of liberal societies. Paden goes back to "A Theory of Justice" to state that all societies seek one good - the protection of their just institutions.

This essay presents a theory of aesthetics for landscape gardening based on Karsten Harries’s theory of the ethical function of architecture. It begins with an attempt to understand Horace Walpole’s praise of William Kent’s contribution to the development of “the modern taste in gardening,” according to which Kent was largely responsible for achieving the progressive revolution in landscape architecture that produced the picturesque style of English landscape gardening. After examining Harries’s theory, the essay discusses whether landscape architecture can produce works (...) of art and examines several historically-important garden styles to argue that it can. Finally, it discusses problems inherent in Modern and Postmodern landscape architecture. (shrink)

This paper outlines a normative/philosophical theory of evolutionary aesthetics, one that differs substantially from existing explanatory/psychological theories, such as Dutton’s. This evolutionary theory is based on Carlson’s scientific cognitivism, but differs in that it is based on evolutionary rather than ecological theory. After offering a short account of Carlson’s theory, I distinguish it from a normative evolutionary aesthetics. I then explore an historically important normative/philosophical theory of the aesthetics of nature that is consistent with Darwin’s theory of natural selection; namely, (...) the theory of the picturesque. Finally, after summarizing Nietzsche’s early theory of tragedy, I discuss how some of his ideas might be incorporated into an evolutionary aesthetics. (shrink)

Discussions of green design and sustainable architecture have become common in the architectural profession, but not in philosophy. This is unfortunate, as philosophers could make important contributions to this discussion, given that these terms rife with ambiguities and that the relationships between these ideas and the traditional Vitruvian values of architecture (beauty, structure, and utility) are unclear. In a recent article, Tom Spector addresses some of these issues to assess whether the notion of sustainability could underpin an entire design philosophy. (...) He concludes that it cannot. I argue that Spector’s argumentsare flawed. After discussing the history of green design, I connect a number of theories in the new field of environmental aesthetics to the question of architectural aesthetics to show how sustainability might inform architecture. (shrink)

This book attempts to develop a view of morality which takes “relationship” to be foundational. Its author, Kellenberger, believes that most philosophical treatments of morality have too narrow a conception of their subject matter—understanding it to be at bottom nothing more than a set of obligations, virtues, or rights. Therefore, he attempts a different approach, one strongly influenced by Christian theology. Nevertheless, he does discuss the work of a number of traditional moral philosophers, such as Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, as (...) well as some contemporary feminists, in particular, Nell Noddings. (shrink)

The practice of preserving various parts of urban landscapes for historical purposes raises a variety of normative, metaphysical, and conceptual questions that invite philosophical analysis. The normative questions are particularly interesting. Why should we preserve historical sites? What sites are worth preserving? How should they be preserved and interpreted?1 In this essay, I apply Nietzsche’s theories of history and culture as found in the first two Untimely Meditations to provide a fresh critical framework to some normative questions raised by a (...) particularly difficult instance of historical preservation; namely, the preservation of Confederate monuments. This framework allows me to argue that some monuments should be removed from their prominent public sites, while others should be retained and reinterpreted. (shrink)

Many philosophers and environmentalists have advocated the development of a revolutionary new moral paradigm that treats natural objects as “morally considerable” in-themselves, independently of their relation to human beings. Often it is claimed that we need to develop a radically new theory of value to underpin this new paradigm. In this paper, I argue against this position and in favor of a more critical approach to environmental ethics. Such a critical approach, I believe, is not only more politically sound, but (...) it is not open to the kinds of objections that afflict “biocentric moral theories” that depend on a conception of the intrinsic worth of nature. In the first sections of the paper, I develop a set of these criticism. In the last part of the paper, I turn to examine the advantages of a critical approach to environmental ethics. (shrink)

This essay present a critical analysis of Hare's article 'Contrasting Methods in Environmental Planning' . It argues that Hare has drawn an important distinction between two 'methods' used in both urban and environmental planning, and that Hare is correct in the conclusion of his argument that one of these methods, 'the trial-design method', is superior to the other, 'the means-end method'. However, this paper presents a new argument in support of that conclusion. This new argument is important for two reasons. (...) First, it points to the existence of at least two different kinds of preference schedule. Second, it supports a type of decision making procedure to be used in 'multiple-client situations' different from the one envisioned by Hare. This procedure, oddly enough, resembles the procedures outlined by both Habermas and Rawls. However, it can be defended on recognisably utilitarian grounds. (shrink)

This paper argues against evolutionary accounts of aesthetics by defending the idea that our fundamental aesthetic categories have undergone great changes in the last two millennia, in particular, during an “artistic revolution” that lasted from 1680 to 1830. This revolution was made possible by the development of a number of technologies of art that created a separate cultural space for this new invention. The attempt to extend this revolution to include the aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment is aided by (...) a new set of technologies that help make an aesthetic object out of natural environments. This even morerecent development is further evidence against an evolutionary explanation of art. (shrink)

Environmental ethics has been strongly influenced by biological ideas. This essay traces a number of these influences. Unfortunately, environmental ethicists have tended to produce moral theories on a grand scale. This tendency is criticized. It is argued that environmental ethicists should allow the ecological conception of the complexity of biological communities to influence their conception of the moral community. If this were to happen, it is argued, they would have to turn away from grand theories to 'theories of the middle (...) range' while adopting a more 'empirical' approach to moral philosophy. (shrink)

Unfortunately, as the Chinese might say, we live in very interesting times. Recent technological developments have had the effect of shrinking the world, and, although they have not created the “global village” foreseen by Marshall McLuhan, they have caused major changes in the more familiar “villages” of the past—the family, the community, and the nation—while calling into question the moralities and moral ideals which have found their natural homes within those older “villages.” One of those older moral ideals is that (...) of patriotism. In the lead essay in this volume, Martha Nussbaum argues against this ideal and for another equally old ideal, the stoic ideal of the cosmopolitan, the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings. Nussbaum’s essay originally appeared in Boston Review, along with twenty-nine replies. Eleven of those replies, some substantially reworked, appear in this volume, together with five new essays and a final response by Nussbaum. Nussbaum’s respondents span the political spectrum and include such luminaries as Sissela Bok, Richard Falk, Amy Gutmann, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Elaine Scarry, Amartya Sen, and Charles Taylor. Together these essays raise more questions than they answer, reveal hidden complexities in seemingly simple issues, and force the reader to see the world from a variety of sometimes uncomfortable perspectives. In short, they make up a very interesting and very good philosophical text. (shrink)